تطور نظام السياسة التجارية في الصين

تطور نظام السياسة التجارية في الصين
مكتب المعلومات التابع لمجلس الدولة.
جمهورية الصين الشعبية.
ديسمبر 2018، بكين.
1. التقدم التاريخي في الصين و رسكو؛ s التجارة الخارجية.
II. إصلاح والتحسينات إلى الصين و رسكو؛ s نظام التجارة الخارجية.
III. تنمية التجارة الخارجية في الصين يساهم في الاقتصاد العالمي.
IV. تعزيز النمو المتوازن أساسا للتجارة الخارجية.
خامسا - إقامة شراكات اقتصادية وتجارية شاملة من خلال التعاون المتبادل المنفعة.
السادس. تحقيق التنمية المستدامة للتجارة الخارجية.
السلام والتنمية والتعاون هي الاتجاهات في العالم اليوم و رسكو؛ ق. ومنذ اعتماد سياسة الاصلاح والانفتاح قبل اكثر من 30 عاما، تمتثل الصين لاتجاه العولمة الاقتصادية من خلال الانفتاح على العالم الخارجى وتعزيز التعاون الاقتصادى والتجارى مع الدول الاخرى على اساس المساواة والمنفعة المتبادلة. خلال سنوات من التنمية، التجارة الخارجية أصبحت واحدة من الصين و رسكو؛ s الأكثر ديناميكية والأسرع نموا قطاعات، وضع الصين بين العالم أكبر البلدان التجارة. وقد عززت تنمية التجارة الخارجية للصين العلاقات مع الأمة مع بقية العالم، ودفعت بفعالية إلى الأمام البلاد و رسكو؛ ق التحديث، وروجت العالم الازدهار والتقدم.
دخلت الصين منظمة التجارة العالمية فى عام 2001. وخلال العقد الماضى، سارعت الصين الى اندماجها فى الاقتصاد العالمى، بينما تم تعزيز تجارتها الخارجية بشكل اكبر. في الذكرى العاشرة لانضمام الصين إلى منظمة التجارة العالمية، تصدر الحكومة الصينية هذا الكتاب الأبيض لإعطاء مقدمة شاملة لتنمية التجارة الخارجية للصين.
1. التقدم التاريخي في الصين و رسكو؛ s التجارة الخارجية.
بعد تأسيس جمهورية الصين الشعبية (برك) في عام 1949، التزمت الصين بمبدأ الاستقلال والاعتماد على الذات، وأجرت تدريجيا التبادلات الاقتصادية والتجارية مع الدول الأجنبية. ومع ذلك، عرقلت البيئة السياسية الدولية في ذلك الوقت والوطن و رسكو؛ ق المخطط النظام الاقتصادي، وكانت الصين التجارة الخارجية التنمية بطيئة نسبيا.
في عام 1978 دخلت الصين فترة جديدة من الإصلاح والانفتاح. أصبح تكريس الجهود الكبيرة لتطوير التجارة الخارجية نهجا هاما لتسريع التحديث، التخلص من التخلف، وتعزيز نمو الاقتصاد، وتحسين القوة الوطنية الشاملة. على مدى السنوات ال 30 الماضية أو نحو ذلك، اغتنام الفرصة للاقتصاد العالمي على المدى الطويل الازدهار وتعميق العولمة الاقتصادية، فتحت الصين على نطاق أوسع للعالم الخارجي، جذبت واستخدمت الاستثمار الأجنبي، أدخلت التكنولوجيا المتقدمة، تحولت ورفع مستوى المحلية والصناعات، وحققت التطور السريع في التجارة الخارجية من خلال المشاركة الشاملة في التقسيم الدولي للعمل والمنافسة.
- الصين إجمالي حجم التجارة في السلع تحتل المرتبة العالية عالميا. وفي عام 1978، كانت القيمة الإجمالية للصادرات والاستيراد في الصين 20.6 مليار دولار أمريكي فقط، لتحتل المرتبة 32 في التجارة العالمية وتمثل أقل من 1 في المائة من المجموع العالمي. وفى عام 2018 بلغت القيمة الاجمالية للصادرات والاستيراد فى الصين 2.974 تريليون دولار امريكى بزيادة 144 مرة عن عام 1978 حيث بلغ معدل النمو السنوى 16.8 فى المائة. وفى عام 2018 بلغ اجمالى قيمة صادرات الصين 1.5778 تريليون دولار امريكى بزيادة 17.2 فى المائة سنويا فى المتوسط ​​وبلغت قيمة الواردات 1.3962 تريليون دولار امريكى بزيادة 16.4 فى المائة سنويا. في عام 2018، وشكلت إجمالي حجم صادرات الصين واستيراد ل 10.4 في المئة و 9.1 في المئة من العالم و رسكو؛ s مجموع، على التوالي. وبحلول نهاية عام 2018 كانت الصين العالم أكبر مصدر وثاني أكبر مستورد لمدة سنتين متتاليتين.
(الشكل 1 الصين و رسكو؛ ق استيراد وتصدير السلع 1978-2018)
- هيكل الصين و رسكو؛ s التجارة في السلع قد تغيرت جذريا. وتحول هيكل الصادرات السلعية للصين من المنتجات الأولية التي هيمنت على السلع المصنعة التي هيمنت عليها في الثمانينيات، ومن المنتجات الصناعية والنسيجية الخفيفة أساسا إلى المنتجات الميكانيكية والإلكترونية أساسا في التسعينات. في القرن الجديد، الصين و رسكو؛ ق تصدير منتجات التكنولوجيا الفائقة، بقيادة الالكترونيات و تكنولوجيا المعلومات السلع، توسعت بشكل متزايد. بالإضافة إلى الشركات المملوكة للدولة والشركات الأجنبية المستثمرة والمؤسسات الخاصة الانخراط أيضا في التجارة الخارجية، وقيمتها الإجمالية للاستيراد والتصدير قد تجاوز كل من الشركات المملوكة للدولة. من 1980s إلى أوائل القرن ال 21، ازدهرت التجارة تجهيز الصين و رسكو؛ s s، وهو ما يمثل نصف حجم التجارة الخارجية في البلاد. في جميع أنحاء الصين و رسكو؛ ق التجارة الخارجية التنمية، الشركات الأجنبية-- المستثمرة وتجارة المعالجة لعبت أدوارا كبيرة جدا.
(الجدول 1 هيكل السلع التصديرية للصين 1980-2018)
وقالت صحيفة / تشاينا ديلى / ان الصين شكلت سوقا شاملا ومتنوعا للاستيراد والتصدير. ومنذ اعتماد سياسة الاصلاح والانفتاح، تعمل الصين على تعزيز التجارة الخارجية على جميع الجبهات، واقامت علاقات تجارية مع الغالبية العظمى من دول ومناطق العالم. وقد زاد الشركاء التجاريين في الصين من عدد قليل من البلدان والمناطق في عام 1978 إلى 231 دولة ومنطقة الآن. أصبح الاتحاد الأوروبى والولايات المتحدة ورابطة دول جنوب شرق آسيا (الآسيان) واليابان ودول البريك الأخرى الصين شركاء تجاريين رئيسيين. وفي هذا القرن الجديد، حافظت التجارة الصينية مع الأسواق الناشئة حديثا والبلدان النامية على نمو مستدام وسريع نسبيا. وفي التجارة الإجمالية للسلع في الفترة بين عامي 2005 و 2018، ارتفعت نسبة التجارة مع رابطة أمم جنوب شرق آسيا من 9.2 في المائة إلى 9.8 في المائة، مع بلدان أخرى في منطقة بريك من 4.9 في المائة إلى 6.9 في المائة، وأمريكا اللاتينية من 3.5 في المائة إلى 6.2 في المائة، من 2،8٪ إلى 4،3٪.
(الشكل 2 الصين و [رسقوو]؛ ق أعلى 10 شركاء التجارة البضائع في 2018)
- تم تعزيز القدرة التنافسية الدولية للصين في تجارة الخدمات. مع دخول منظمة التجارة العالمية، دخلت التجارة الصينية في الخدمات مرحلة جديدة من التنمية. مع حجمها الموسع بسرعة ونمطها تدريجيا الأمثل، الصين و رسكو؛ s التجارة في الخدمات الآن تحتل المرتبة بين أعلى في العالم. الصين و رسكو؛ ق التجارة في السياحة والنقل وغيرها من المجالات حافظت على زخم النمو المطرد. كما أن الخدمات عبر الحدود في الصين في مجالات البناء والاتصالات والتأمين والتمويل والحواسيب والمعلومات والإتاوات ورسوم الترخيص والتشاور والمجالات ذات الصلة فضلا عن الاستعانة بمصادر خارجية للخدمات تنمو بسرعة. من عام 2001 إلى عام 2018 شهدت قيمة التجارة الإجمالية للخدمات الصينية (باستثناء الخدمات الحكومية) نموا بأكثر من خمسة أضعاف من 71.9 مليار دولار أمريكي إلى 362.4 مليار دولار أمريكي. وارتفعت صادرات الصين من صادرات التجارة العالمية من 2.4 في المئة إلى 4.6 في المئة، بقيمة 170.2 مليار دولار في 2018، وقفزت من المركز الثاني عشر في العالم إلى الرابع، وارتفعت نسبة الصين فى واردات تجارة الخدمات العالمية من 2.6 فى المائة الى 5.5 فى المائة، وبلغت 192.2 مليار دولار امريكى فى عام 2018، حيث انتقلت من المركز العاشر فى العالم الى المركز الثالث.
(الشكل 3 الصين الخدمات التجارة الواردات والصادرات 1982-2018)
(الشكل 4 نمو الصادرات والصادرات في قطاعات الخدمات الرئيسية 2005-2018)
الصين و رسكو؛ ق التنمية التجارة الخارجية دفعت إلى الأمام إلى حد كبير البلاد و رسكو؛ ق تحديث محرك الأقراص. وقد نمت الصين إلى اقتصاد مفتوح. المشاركة في التقسيم الدولي للعمل والمنافسة، وإدخال التكنولوجيا المتقدمة والمعدات وطرق الإدارة، والاستفادة من الاستثمار الأجنبي المباشر قد عززت كثيرا التقدم التكنولوجي في الصين ورفع مستوى الصناعة، وأيضا تحسين الإدارة والقدرة التنافسية في السوق من مؤسساتها. وقد جلب النمو السريع لتجهيز التجارة في اللعب ميزة نسبية في الصين من قوة العمل وفيرة، وتسارع البلاد و رسكو؛ ق التصنيع والتحضر. وقد ساهمت التجارة الخارجية بشكل مباشر في توظيف أكثر من 80 مليون شخص صيني، أكثر من 60 في المئة منهم من المناطق الريفية، والموظفين و [رسقوو]؛ تحسنت مستويات الدخل والمعيشة تحسنا ملحوظا. وقد أصبحت التجارة الخارجية والاستثمار المحلي والاستهلاك المحلي المحركات الرئيسية الثلاثة دفع النمو الاقتصادي في الصين.
إن التقدم التاريخي في التجارة الخارجية للصين قد ارتبط ارتباطا وثيقا بالتغيرات في الأوضاع الدولية والمحلية. وابتداء من الثمانينات، أصبح السلام والتنمية موضوع العصر. ومع تسارع العولمة الاقتصادية، أصبح تدفق وتخصيص رأس المال والتكنولوجيا والمنتجات والأسواق والموارد والقوى العاملة والعناصر المماثلة أكثر ديناميكية في جميع أنحاء العالم. وقد أدى التقدم العلمي والتكنولوجي، الذي تقوده تكنولوجيا المعلومات والاتصالات، إلى تحسين كبير في كفاءة الإنتاج؛ فإن النقل الصناعي الدولي يتعمق ويتطور باستمرار. وقد وفرت العولمة الاقتصادية والتقدم العلمى والتكنولوجى والنقل الصناعى الدولى وتعزيز التعاون بين الدول فرصا تاريخية للاندماج فى الاقتصاد العالمى. وقد نفذت الحكومة الصينية، التى تتفق مع اتجاه العصر، واتخذت البناء الاقتصادى كمهمة مركزية، سياسة الاصلاح والانفتاح، وتطورت التعاون الاقتصادى والتكنولوجى مع الدول الاخرى، واستثمرت الاستثمارات الاجنبية بقوة وبطريقة عقلانية، وحققت ميزتها النسبية فى وشجع على تعميق تقسيم العمل في السلسلة الصناعية الدولية، ووفرت الظروف المواتية لتنمية التجارة الخارجية الخاصة بها. وخلال هذه العملية حصلت الشركات الأجنبية والشركات متعددة الجنسيات على وجه الخصوص على فرص وفيرة للاستثمار في الصين، قيمة مضافة لرؤوس أموالهم والتكنولوجيا والخبرة الإدارية وقنوات التسويق وغيرها من العناصر، وتقاسم ثمار النمو الاقتصادي السريع للصين. إن تنمية التجارة الخارجية للصين تستفيد كثيرا من إصلاحها وانفتاحها، من العولمة الاقتصادية، ومن أخذ مسار التعاون والمنفعة المتبادلة. الصين لا يمكن أن تتطور نفسها بمعزل عن بقية العالم، والرخاء العالمي والاستقرار لا يمكن الحفاظ عليها دون مشاركة الصين.
ولا تزال الصين بلدا ناميا. وبالمقارنة مع القوى التجارية العالمية الأخرى، لا تزال صناعة التصدير في الصين في نهاية منخفضة من السلسلة الصناعية العالمية. الصين و رسكو؛ s الموارد والطاقة المدخلات والتكلفة البيئية مرتفعة نسبيا، في حين أن القدرة التنافسية الدولية للمؤسسات والمقاومة للمخاطر من بعض الصناعات ضعيفة نسبيا. الصين التحول من بلد تجاري كبير إلى قوة تجارية قوية ستكون عملية طويلة نسبيا نسبيا تتطلب جهودا شاقة.
II. إصلاح والتحسينات إلى الصين و رسكو؛ s نظام التجارة الخارجية.
وقبل ان تتبنى الصين سياسة الاصلاح والانفتاح فى عام 1978، كان تجارتها الخارجية محكومة بالتخطيط الالزامى، واستوعبت الدولة كلا من ارباح وخسائر الشركات. منذ أن بدأت سياسة الإصلاح والانفتاح، أنجزت الصين نظام التجارة الخارجية التحول من التخطيط الإلزامي لإفساح المجال كاملا للدور الأساسي للسوق - من احتكار الدولة إلى الانفتاح الكامل، ومن المساواة العشوائية لإعطاء الشركات تقديرية وإدارتها وجعلها مسؤولة عن أرباحها وخسائرها. وخلال المفاوضات حول استعادة عضوية غات (الاتفاق العام بشأن التعريفات الجمركية والتجارة) والانضمام إلى منظمة التجارة العالمية، وبعد أن أصبحت عضوا في منظمة التجارة العالمية، اعتمدت الصين تدريجيا الممارسات التجارية الدولية، وأنشأت نظاما للتجارة الخارجية موحدا ومفتوحا يتوافق مع وقواعد التجارة المتعددة الأطراف.
خلال الفترة الأولى من الإصلاح والانفتاح، ركز إصلاح نظام التجارة الخارجية في الصين على التحول من تخطيطها الموحد، ونقل إدارة وتشغيل السلطة في التجارة الخارجية إلى مستويات أقل، وتنفيذ نظام السماح للشركات للاحتفاظ معينة جزء من عائدات النقد الأجنبي، وإنشاء سوق تنسيق العملات الأجنبية. استوعبت الصين الاستثمار المباشر الأجنبي لإدخال الشركات الأجنبية المستثمرة ككيانات تجارية جديدة في قطاع التجارة الخارجية، وكسر احتكار مؤسسات التجارة الخارجية المملوكة للدولة. بعد ذلك، أدخلت الصين نظام المسؤولية في القيام بالتجارة الخارجية، تدريجيا محل التخطيط الإلزامي مع التخطيط الموجه. كما وضعت الدولة نظاما لحسومات ضريبة الصادرات تمشيا مع الممارسة العامة للتجارة الدولية. وفى اكتوبر عام 1992، قدمت الصين بوضوح هدف الاصلاح نحو اقتصاد سوق اشتراكى. وقد أجري إصلاح شامل لنظم المالية والضرائب والمصارف والتجارة الخارجية والعملات الأجنبية وفقا لذلك. وفى يناير عام 1994، اوقفت الحكومة الصينية جميع اعانات التصدير، مما جعل جميع شركات الاستيراد والتصدير مسئولة بشكل كامل عن ارباحها وخسائرها. وأسعار الصرف الرسمية والرسمية التي تنظمها السوق في الصين، والرنمينبي (رمب)، تتعايش في نظام سعر صرف عائم وحدوي ومدار استنادا إلى الطلب في السوق والعرض. وقد أدرجت مؤسسات التجارة الخارجية، ونفذت برامج رائدة لنظام الاستيراد والتصدير. وفي العام نفسه، صدر قانون التجارة الخارجية لجمهورية الصين الشعبية، ووضع مبادئ مثل صون نظام التجارة الخارجية من حيث الإنصاف والحرية، ونظام قانوني أساسي للتجارة الخارجية. وفي كانون الأول / ديسمبر 1996، أدركت الصين إمكانية تحويل الحساب الجاري لليوان. وفى الوقت نفسه، قامت الصين طواعية بخفض الرسوم الجمركية بشكل كبير، وخفضت الاجراءات غير الجمركية مثل الحصص والتراخيص. ساعدت اجراءات الاصلاح هذه الصين فى البداية على اقامة نظام ادارة وتنظيم التجارة الخارجية يقوم على اساس اقتصاد السوق، واطلاق العنان للعوامل الاقتصادية مثل سعر الصرف والضرائب والتعريفة والتمويل.
وفى 11 ديسمبر عام 2001، اصبحت الصين العضو ال 143 فى منظمة التجارة العالمية بعد 16 عاما من المفاوضات. ومن اجل الوفاء بالتزاماتها عند الانضمام الى منظمة التجارة العالمية، وسعت الصين من انفتاحها فى مجالات الصناعة والزراعة وتجارة الخدمات وتسريع وتيسير التجارة والاستثمار وتحرير الاقتصاد. وفي الوقت نفسه، عمقت الدولة إصلاح نظام التجارة الخارجية، وتحسين نظامها القانوني التجارة الخارجية، والحد من الحواجز التجارية والتدخل الإداري، وترشيد مسؤوليات الحكومة في إدارة التجارة الخارجية، وجعل سلوك الحكومة أكثر انفتاحا وأكثر نزيها وأكثر شفافية، وتعزيز تنمية اقتصاد مفتوح إلى مرحلة جديدة.
- التعجيل بتحسين النظام القانوني للعلاقات الاقتصادية الخارجية والتجارة. وبعد انضمام الصين الى منظمة التجارة العالمية، استعرضت الصين اكثر من 2300 من القوانين واللوائح والقواعد الادارية. أما تلك التي لا تتفق مع قواعد منظمة التجارة العالمية والتزامات الصين عند الانضمام إلى منظمة التجارة العالمية فقد ألغيت أو نقحت. وتخفض إجراءات الترخيص الإداري وتنظم في القوانين واللوائح المنقحة، كما تم وضع وتحسين نظام قانوني لتعزيز التجارة وسبل الانتصاف. ووفقا للاتفاق المتعلق بجوانب حقوق الملكية الفكرية المتصلة بالتجارة الذي تديره منظمة التجارة العالمية، نقحت الصين قوانينها وأنظمتها وتفسيراتها القضائية المتعلقة بحقوق الملكية الفكرية، ومن ثم شيدت نظاما قانونيا كاملا يتفق مع الصين والظروف الفعلية والممارسات الدولية.
- اتخاذ المزيد من التدابير لخفض التعريفات الجمركية وتخفيض التدابير غير الجمركية. وخلال الفترة الانتقالية التي أعقبت دخول الصين إلى منظمة التجارة العالمية، تم تخفيض الرسوم الجمركية على الواردات من 15.3 في المائة في عام 2001 إلى 9.9 في المائة في عام 2005. وبحلول كانون الثاني / يناير 2005، كانت غالبية التزامات خفض التعريفة الجمركية في الصين استيفاء؛ وقد أزالت الصين الحواجز غير الجمركية، بما في ذلك الحصص والترخيص والعطاءات المحددة، والتدابير المتعلقة ب 424 من التعريفات الجمركية، وأبقت فقط على إدارة الترخيص على الواردات الخاضعة للرقابة من أجل السلامة العامة والبيئة بما يتماشى مع الاتفاقيات الدولية وقواعد منظمة التجارة العالمية. وبحلول عام 2018 انخفض معدل التعريفة الشاملة للصين الى 9.8 فى المائة - 15.2 فى المائة فى حالة المنتجات الزراعية و 8.9 فى المائة فى حالة المنتجات الصناعية. ومنذ عام 2005، حافظت الصين تماما على معدل التعريفات الجمركية.
- التحرر الكامل من فرص الوصول إلى عمليات التجارة الخارجية. وفقا لقانون التجارة الخارجية لجمهورية الصين الشعبية الذي تم تنقيحه في عام 2004، ابتداء من يوليو 2004، تجار التجارة الخارجية تحتاج فقط للتسجيل مع السلطة المسؤولة، ولم يعد لدينا لطلب موافقة من الحكومة الصينية. وقد يسر هذا التغيير تنويع كيانات التجارة الخارجية للصين، التي تتألف من الشركات المملوكة للدولة والمؤسسات الأجنبية المستثمرة والخاصة. وقد حافظت واردات وصادرات الشركات المملوكة للدولة والمستثمرين الاجنبى على نمو مستدام بينما شهدت المؤسسات الخاصة نموا فى تجارتها الخارجية بشكل سريع وحصتها من سوق الاستيراد والتصدير فى الصين تواصل التوسع، لتصبح لاعبين رئيسيين فى الصين. التجارة. في عام 2018 كان حجم الواردات والصادرات من الشركات المملوكة للدولة والشركات الأجنبية المستثمرة والمؤسسات الخاصة في البلاد و رسكو؛ s مجموع 20.9 في المئة، 53.8 في المئة و 25.3 في المئة، على التوالي.
- زيادة فتح سوق الخدمات. وقد أوفت الصين بشكل جاد بالتزاماتها عند الانضمام إلى منظمة التجارة العالمية من خلال إتاحة إمكانية الوصول إلى الأسواق لمقدمي الخدمات الدوليين في مجموعة واسعة من المجالات، بما في ذلك التمويل والاتصالات والبناء والتوزيع واللوجستيات والسياحة والتعليم. وقد فتحت الصين 100 من القطاعات الفرعية لمنظمة التجارة العالمية 160 لتجارة الخدمات، تقترب من المستوى المتوسط ​​للبلدان المتقدمة. في عام 2018 تم إنشاء ما مجموعه 13،905 الشركات الأجنبية المستثمرة في قطاع الخدمات في الصين، مع 48.7 مليار دولار من الاستثمارات الأجنبية المستخدمة فعلا، وهو ما يمثل 50.7 في المئة من العدد الإجمالي للشركات التي استثمرت حديثا الأجنبية في الصين و [رسقوو]؛ و 46.1 في المائة من إجمالي الاستثمارات الأجنبية المستخدمة فعليا في تلك السنة، على التوالي.
- خلق مستوى اللعب. وقد سعت الصين جاهدة إلى توفير سوق مرنة وعادلة ومستقرة للمؤسسات المحلية والدولية من خلال إنشاء وتحسين النظام القانوني وآلية إنفاذ القانون والإشراف على التجارة العادلة والحد من الممارسات غير العادلة في عمليات التجارة الخارجية والقضاء عليها مما يشكل انتهاكا للحقوق والإغراق والتهريب وتعطيل نظام السوق. وعقب القوانين المحلية وقواعد التجارة الدولية، عززت الصين جهودها في مجال الرصد والإنذار المبكر، واعتمدت تدابير مثل العلاج التجاري والتحقيق في مكافحة الاحتكار لتصحيح الممارسات غير العادلة لشركائها التجاريين، وحماية الحقوق والمصالح المشروعة للصناعات المحلية والمؤسسات. وفي مواجهة الأزمة المالية الدولية، عملت الصين جنبا إلى جنب مع المجتمع الدولي على معارضة صارمة لجميع أشكال الحمائية التجارية، والتقيد الصارم بقواعد منظمة التجارة العالمية ذات الصلة، وعالجت المنتجات المحلية والأجنبية على قدم المساواة مع تنفيذ خطة التحفيز، وتعزيز المنافسة العادلة بين المحلية والشركات الأجنبية.
وبحلول عام 2018، تم الوفاء بجميع الالتزامات التي تعهدت بها الصين لدى الانضمام إلى منظمة التجارة العالمية. الصين وأشاد الجهود الجادة من قبل غالبية أعضاء منظمة التجارة العالمية. تلقت الحكومة الصينية ثلاثة استعراضات للسياسة التجارية من منظمة التجارة العالمية في 2006 و 2008 و 2018، على التوالي. وقد أدرجت المبادئ الأساسية لمنظمة التجارة العالمية، مثل عدم التمييز والشفافية والمنافسة العادلة، في القوانين واللوائح والأنظمة ذات الصلة في الصين. وقد تحقق فهم عميق لمفاهيم مثل التوجه نحو السوق والانفتاح والمنافسة العادلة وسيادة القانون وحقوق الملكية الفكرية بين الشعب الصينى، وتعزيز المزيد من الانفتاح للاقتصاد الوطنى والمزيد من التحسينات فى اقتصاد السوق.
III. تنمية التجارة الخارجية في الصين يساهم في الاقتصاد العالمي.
وقد تسارع تطوير التجارة الخارجية للصين في تحديث الاقتصاد الوطني، وتعزيز قوة شاملة في البلاد، وتحسين مستوى معيشة أكثر من 1.3 مليار شخص صيني. كما ساعد على دمج الاقتصاد الصيني في الاقتصاد العالمي وجعل العولمة الاقتصادية مواتية للازدهار المشترك لجميع البلدان والمناطق.
الصين والإصلاح والانفتاح ومشاركتها النشطة في العولمة الاقتصادية جعلت البلاد واحدة من الاقتصادات الأسرع نموا في العالم. على مدى أكثر من 10 سنوات الماضية، أصبحت الصين، جنبا إلى جنب مع الاقتصادات الناشئة الأخرى، قوة متزايدة الأهمية تدفع النمو الاقتصادي العالمي. ووفقا للبنك الدولى، ارتفع الناتج المحلى الاجمالى للصين من عام 2001 الى عام 2018 بمقدار 4.6 تريليون دولار امريكى، وهو ما يمثل 14.7 فى المائة من الزيادة فى اجمالى العالم، وارتفع نصيب الناتج المحلى الاجمالى للصين فى العالم الى 9.3 فى المائة على الفترة نفسها. وتشير بيانات منظمة التجارة العالمية إلى أن معدل النمو السنوي للصادرات والواردات الصينية من عام 2000 إلى عام 2009 كان 17 في المائة و 15 في المائة على التوالي، وهو معدل أعلى بكثير من معدل النمو السنوي البالغ 3 في المائة للتجارة العالمية.
خلال الأزمة المالية الدولية، كانت التجارة الخارجية للصين من بين أول من الاستقرار، وتعزيز انتعاش الاقتصاد العالمي. وبعد اندلاع الأزمة فى عام 2008، تبنت الحكومة الصينية فى الوقت المناسب سلسلة من السياسات والتدابير الرامية إلى تحفيز الاقتصاد وتوسيع الطلب المحلى وتحقيق استقرار الواردات والصادرات. في عام 2009، انخفضت واردات السلع العالمية بنسبة 12.8 في المئة، في حين ارتفعت واردات السلع الصينية بنسبة 2.9 في المئة، مما يجعلها الدولة الوحيدة للحفاظ على النمو بين العالم أكبر الاقتصادات. وقد عزز عامل الصين صادرات العديد من البلدان المتضررة من الأزمة المالية، وحفز الطلب في سوق السلع العالمية، وعزز الثقة، مما أعطى زخما جديدا للانتعاش الاقتصادي والنمو الاقتصادي العالمي. وخلال استعراضها الثالث للسياسة التجارية للصين، أشارت منظمة التجارة العالمية إلى أن الصين قد لعبت دورا بناء فى تحفيز الطلب العالمى خلال الأزمة المالية الدولية، ومن ثم أسهمت إسهاما كبيرا فى استقرار الاقتصاد العالمى.
وقد ساعد تطوير التجارة الخارجية للصين في تعزيز الرفاهية الوطنية للصين وشركائها التجاريين. ومع تسريع اندماجها فى تقسيم العمل العالمى، تطورت الصين تدريجيا لتصبح منتجا ومصدرا رئيسيا للمنتجات الصناعية تعتمد على ميزتها لتكاليف العمالة، والقدرات الصناعية القوية نسبيا للدعم والتصنيع والتصنيع، وزيادة انتاجية العمل. ويوفر السلع الرخيصة والجودة لتلبية مطالب متنوعة من السوق الدولية. الصين ميزة بسبب وفورات الحجم وتكاليف المعالجة المنخفضة في الصناعة التحويلية العالمية تعوض جزئيا ارتفاع أسعار العوامل المنبع الإنتاج، ولعب دورا هاما في الحد من التضخم العالمي ورفع القوة الشرائية الحقيقية للمستهلكين من شركائها التجاريين.
وقد وفرت تنمية التجارة الخارجية للصين سوقا واسعة لشركائها التجاريين. ومنذ عام 2001، زادت واردات الصين من السلع بنحو خمس مرات، وهو ما يمثل معدل نمو سنوي يبلغ حوالي 20 في المائة. وقد أصبحت الواردات سريعة التوسع في الصين قوة دافعة رئيسية للنمو الاقتصادي العالمي، مما يخلق سوقا هائلة لشركائها التجاريين لزيادة صادراتهم. وفى الوقت الحاضر، تعد الصين اكبر سوق تصدير لليابان وجمهورية كوريا واستراليا والاسيان والبرازيل وجنوب افريقيا وهى ثانى اكبر سوق للاتحاد الاوروبى وثالث اكبر سوق للولايات المتحدة والهند. وبما أن الصين والتحضر والتحضر يتقدمان بسرعة، ويظل الطلب المحلي في ازدياد مستمر، فإن التوسع المستمر وفتح الأسواق في البلاد سيتيحان فرصا متزايدة لشركائها التجاريين.
وفى الوقت نفسه، تعد الصين احدى الدول النامية التى تمنح اكبر امكانية الوصول الى الاسواق للدول الاقل تقدما. وبحلول يوليو / تموز 2018، منحت الصين معاملة تعريفة جمركية لأكثر من 4700 سلعة من 36 بلدا من أقل البلدان نموا، أقامت علاقات دبلوماسية مع الصين. وشكلت السلع التعريفية الصفرية 60 في المائة من إجمالي الواردات من تلك البلدان. وقد وعدت الصين بمواصلة توسيع معاملتها التفضيلية لأقل البلدان نموا التى لها علاقات دبلوماسية مع الصين حتى تصل السلع الجمركية الصفرية الى 97 فى المائة من اجمالى الواردات من تلك الدول. وقد ساعد التدبير التعريفي الصفرى على زيادة صادرات أقل البلدان نموا إلى الصين. ومنذ عام 2008، كانت الصين أكبر سوق تصدير لأقل البلدان نموا. وفي عام 2018، شكلت واردات الصين من أقل البلدان نموا ما يقرب من ربع تلك البلدان و [رسقوو]؛ إجمالي الصادرات، بزيادة قدرها 58 في المئة عن العام السابق.
وقد شاركت الصين في عملية إصلاح آلية الإدارة الاقتصادية العالمية وساعدت على دفعها قدما. الحكومة الصينية تدعو بنشاط و لدكو؛ متوازنة، شاملة و المنفعة المتبادلة و رديقو. ونظام تجاري متعدد الأطراف، وتسعى جاهدة إلى إقامة نظام اقتصادي وتجاري دولي جديد عادل ومنصف. والصين، بوصفها بلدا ناميا كبيرا ذات اقتصاد سريع النمو، تلعب دورا نشطا في مؤتمرات قمة مجموعة العشرين وبلدان منطقة البحر الكاريبي، ومحادثات جولة الدوحة، وآليات الحوار والتعاون الدولية الأخرى. وتبذل الصين قصارى جهدها لتحمل مسؤوليات دولية تتناسب مع مستوى تنميتها وقوتها. وتدعم الصين بشكل مستمر تعاونها مع الدول الناشئة فى مجالات الاقتصاد والتمويل والتجارة والاستثمار وتعمل على اقامة نظام اقتصادى دولى عادل ومنصف يعود بالفائدة على جميع الدول.
وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، تفي الصين بدقة بالتزاماتها الدولية فيما يتعلق بمراقبة الصادرات. وهي تدعو باستمرار إلى الحظر الكامل لجميع أسلحة الدمار الشامل وتفكيكها بالكامل، وتعارض بشدة انتشار هذه الأسلحة وحامليها. وتنص القوانين ذات الصلة في الصين بوضوح على أن الدولة قد تتخذ التدابير اللازمة لتقييد استيراد وتصدير السلع والتكنولوجيات المتعلقة بالمواد الانشطارية أو المواد التي تستمد منها، وكذلك الاستيراد والتصدير المتصلين بالأسلحة والذخيرة أو إمدادات عسكرية أخرى. وتلتزم الصين جديا بالاتفاقيات الدولية المتعلقة بضوابط التصدير، وتفي بالتزاماتها المتعلقة بعدم الانتشار، وتسهم بنشاط في تحقيق السلام العالمي والاستقرار الإقليمي. على مدى السنوات القليلة الماضية، اعتمدت الحكومة الصينية مجموعة واسعة من المعايير والممارسات المعترف بها دوليا، وشكلت نظاما كاملا لمراقبة الصادرات يغطي المواد النووية والبيولوجية والكيميائية والصواريخ وغيرها من المواد الحساسة والتكنولوجيات، وتوفير الأسس القانونية والضمانات المؤسسية ل تحقيقا أفضل لهدف عدم الانتشار.
IV. تعزيز النمو المتوازن أساسا للتجارة الخارجية.
والعوامل الرئيسية التي تحدد ما إذا كانت التجارة الخارجية للبلد في فائض أو عجز هي هيكلها الاقتصادي والقدرة التنافسية الدولية لمنتجاتها أو خدماتها. الصين لا تسعى لفائض التجارة الخارجية عمدا. كان هناك قدر معين من العجز في تجارة الخدمات الصينية لفترة طويلة، وكانت التجارة في السلع في العجز في معظم السنوات قبل عام 1990. بعد عام 1990، مع الاستعانة بمصادر خارجية على نطاق واسع الصناعية ونقل، وتعزيز الصين قدرتها التنافسية في السلع المصنعة. وتجاوز نمو الصادرات حجم الواردات، مما أدى إلى تحويل العجز الإجمالي إلى فائض في التجارة في السلع. وفى عام 2005، بلغ الفائض فى التجارة فى السلع 100 مليار دولار امريكى للمرة الاولى، تلاه نمو قوى لمدة اربع سنوات متتالية. وفى عام 2008 بلغ الفائض 298.1 مليار دولار امريكى وهو اعلى نقطة فى التاريخ قبل ان يتباطأ تدريجيا. وبلغت الفوائض فى تجارة السلع لعامى 2009 و 2018 195.7 مليار دولار امريكى و 181.6 مليار دولار امريكى بانخفاض 34.4 فى المائة و 7.2 فى المائة على التوالى على اساس سنوى. وفي عام 2018، بلغ الفائض في التجارة في السلع 6.1 في المائة من إجمالي الواردات والصادرات و 3.1 في المائة من الناتج المحلي الإجمالي. ومن بين الدول التسعة التى تتمتع بأكبر موازين تجارية (مواتية أو غير مواتية)، لم ترتفع الصين فى جدول الدوري من حيث النسبتين.
(الجدول 2 مقارنة البلدان التسعة التي لها أكبر أرصدة في التجارة بالسلع في عام 2018)
وحقيقة أن الصين تتمتع بفائض في التجارة في السلع يعكس موقفها في التقسيم الدولي للعمل في المرحلة الراهنة. الصين لديها الآن مزايا كبيرة نسبيا في تجهيز وتجميع المنتجات الصناعية، وهي أكبر منتج ومصدر للمنتجات الصناعية. الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد الأوروبي وبعض البلدان والمناطق الأخرى هي الأسواق الاستهلاكية الرئيسية الرئيسية. ومع نقل عدد كبير من قطاعات التصنيع والتجميع الكثيفة العمالة الى الصين من اليابان وجمهورية كوريا وسنغافورة وتايوان ومنطقة هونج كونج الادارية الخاصة وغيرها من الدول والمناطق، تم نقل فوائضها مع الولايات المتحدة واوروبا الى الصين. والنتيجة هي أنه بينما تتمتع الصين حاليا بفائض في التجارة في السلع في المقام الأول مع الولايات المتحدة وأوروبا، فإنها تعاني أيضا من عجز تجاري طويل الأجل مع اليابان وجمهورية كوريا ورابطة أمم جنوب شرقي آسيا وغيرها من المنتجين الوافدين الرئيسيين. وفى عام 2018 بلغت فوائض الصين فى تجارة السلع مع الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد الاوروبى 181.3 مليار دولار امريكى و 142.8 مليار دولار امريكى على التوالى وان عجزها الكلى فى التجارة بالسلع مع اليابان وجمهورية كوريا والاسيان بلغ 141.6 مليار دولار دولار أمريكي. وصل العجز فى التجارة فى السلع بين البر الرئيسى الصينى وتايوان الى 86 مليار دولار امريكى. ولإنتاج وتصدير المنتجات الصناعية، تحتاج الصين إلى استيراد كميات كبيرة من السلع الأولية، مما يؤدي إلى حدوث عجز في التجارة في السلع مع بعض المصدرين للسلع الأولية. هذا هو مستوى مختلف البلاد وحالة المشاركة في التقسيم الدولي للعمل في الصناعة التحويلية والخدمات التي تؤدي إلى الصين فائض كبير في التجارة في السلع ولكن العجز على المدى الطويل في تجارة الخدمات.
(الشكل 5 أرصدة التجارة الصينية مع الشركاء التجاريين الرئيسيين 2006-2018)
الصين فائض في التجارة في السلع يأتي أساسا من الشركات الأجنبية المستثمرة وتجارة المعالجة. With the spread of economic globalization as well as the refinement of the division of labor and the development of economies of scale, an increasing amount of international trade - intra-industry trade or processing trade based on value-chain specialization - is predominated by multinationals. Since the adoption of the reform and opening up policy in 1978, China has experienced rapid growth in attraction of foreign direct investment. For a fairly long period of time the import and export business of foreign-invested enterprises and processing trade mainly operated by foreign-invested enterprises accounted for about 50 percent of China’s trade volume in goods, and were also the major source of the country’s surplus in trade in goods. In 2009 and 2018 the surplus in trade in goods created by foreign-invested enterprises reached 127 billion U. S. dollars and 124.3 billion U. S. dollars, respectively, accounting for 64.8 percent and 68.4percent of the total surplus of China’s trade in goods in the two years. Processing trade surplus of foreign-invested enterprises in the same period hit 264.6 billion U. S. dollars and 322.9 billion U. S. dollars, significantly higher than the country’s total trade surplus for 2009 and 2018. While foreign-invested enterprises and processing trade enjoyed a big favorable trade balance, the import and export of China’s state-owned enterprises, general trade and other forms of trade were in deficit.
The limits on certain high-tech trade set by developed countries also affect the trade balance between China and some of its trading partners. As China is currently accelerating its pace of industrialization, it needs to import advanced equipment and technologies from developed countries. Unfortunately, some developed countries, sticking to their old way of thinking, impose various restrictions on the export of high-end equipment and advanced technologies to China, resulting in slow growth in the export of these sectors. To a certain extent such limits hinder China’s imports from these countries, posing an unfavorable impact on bilateral trade balance.
As China turned its trade deficit into a surplus, the country improved its international balance of payments and enhanced its resistance to external risks. However, the sharp increase in surplus also created trouble for the Chinese economy. The large volume of RMB input in export settlement complicates macroeconomic control, and the rapid expansion of China’s surplus in trade in goods also results in more trade frictions between China and its trading partners, as well as persistent pressure on the RMB to appreciate.
The Chinese government attaches great importance to the imbalance in the development of foreign trade, and has adopted a series of policies and measures to curb overheated surplus growth. First, it proactively adjusts the economic structure, strives to expand domestic demand, and especially increases investment in projects to improve the people’s livelihood and stimulate household consumption. Second, it enacts a series of policies to expand imports, simplify the procedures of import administration and import payment, lower the temporary tax rates on certain imported commodities, improve the import promotion system and facilitate import businesses. Third, it has adjusted the export tax rebates policy, lowered or cancelled export tax rebates for some products that consume too much energy and cause serious pollution and certain resource-based products. Fourth, it has amended the prohibited and restricted categories of processing trade, expanding the scope of the prohibited category and promoting this sector’s restructuring and upgrading. Fifth, it has changed the situation of the pegged exchange rate of the yuan against the US dollar since the Asian financial crisis, and adopted the administered floating exchange rate system based on market demand, and adjusted it with reference to a basket of currencies from July 21, 2005. During the period from the exchange rate reform in July 2005 to the end of August 2018, the nominal exchange rate of the yuan against the dollar appreciated by about 30 percent.
China’s measures to promote balanced foreign trade growth have achieved obvious effects. The nation’s surplus in trade in goods has been on a steady decline since 2009, and the proportion of surplus in the total import and export trade volume and the GDP also started to drop in 2008, moving toward a balance in foreign trade. China’s efforts not only serve the development of its own economy, but are also practical moves to promote the structural adjustment and the rebalancing of the global economy.
V. Constructing All-round Economic and Trade Partnerships with Mutually Beneficial Cooperation.
China stresses all-round development in its foreign trade. China adheres to developing economic and trade partnerships based on practical cooperation and mutual benefit with all countries, no matter they are big or small, rich or poor.
China enjoys steady growth in its trade with developed countries, and realizes complementary advantages as well as reciprocity and mutual benefit. China’ s trade with the European Union has been developing steadily in recent years. The European Union mainly exports manufactured products to China, including advanced mechanical and electronic products, transport vehicles, complete plants, core parts and components, precision components and other high-tech products which are highly competitive in the Chinese market. Foreign trade between China and the United States has a solid development base. China exports a large variety of consumer goods to meet the demands of American consumers, while satisfying its own need for development by constantly expanding imports of electronic, aerospace, biological, medical, agricultural and services trade items from the United States. China and Japan are geographically proximate to each other and this is an advantage in bilateral trade. Sino-Japanese trade promotes continuous cooperation and progress in industry while spurring the development of regional economic comparative advantages and cooperation in East Asia. China’ s trade and investment cooperation with developed countries such as Canada, Australia, Switzerland and New Zealand also maintain a good momentum of development.
China’s trade with emerging economies and developing countries is experiencing robust growth, with huge development potential. With the comprehensive implementation of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement in 2018, tariffs have been cancelled for 90% of the commodities traded between them, vigorously promoting the rapid growth of bilateral trade between China and ASEAN. The free entry of specialties and competitive products into each other’ s market suits the various needs of the two sides. Foreign trade between China and Republic of Korea keeps growing constantly and steadily. Bilateral investment and economic cooperation also present broad prospects. China’ s trade with the other BRIC countries has been enjoying rapid growth in recent years, which promotes the development of the member countries’ respective advantageous industries and shows the broad development prospects of emerging markets. In recent years China has seen relatively fast growth in its trade with other developing countries, further development of trade with its historical trading partners in the Arab world, broadening areas of economic and trade cooperation with Latin American countries, and bilateral trade with African countries, which gives full play to the complementary advantages of the two sides’ resources and economic structures.
China attaches great importance to the institutional set-up of bilateral and regional economic and trade cooperation. Currently over 150 countries and regions have signed agreements on bilateral trade or economic cooperation with China, which has established and maintains high-level economic dialogue mechanisms with the United States, Europe, Japan, Great Britain, Russia and other major economies. China proactively participates in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ASEAN (10+3) meetings, which also include Japan and Republic of Korea, the East Asia Summit, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Committee, Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Committee, Greater Tumen Initiative, and other regional and subregional economic cooperation mechanisms. China adheres to the principle of “good neighborly friendship and partnership” in establishing and developing various forms of border economic and trade cooperation.
China takes proactive initiatives to participate in and promote regional economic integration. By the end of 2018 China had held 15 rounds of negotiations on free trade or closer economic partnership arrangements with 28 countries and regions on five continents, and signed and implemented 10 free trade agreements or closer economic partnership arrangements. Currently five free trade agreement talks are under way. China advocates the establishment of an East Asia free trade zone. In 2018 the total volume of bilateral trade in goods between China and its trade partners in its ten free trade agreements or closer economic partnership arrangements (ASEAN, Pakistan, Chile, Singapore, New Zealand, Peru, Costa Rica, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR and Taiwan) reached US$782.6 billion, accounting for over a quarter of the country’ s total import and export volume.
China has actively participated in and promoted the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round talks, and strives to safeguard the authority of the multilateral trading system. China stresses that the negotiations should be conducive to the implementation of the principle of fairness and justice of the multilateral trading system, and reflect the goal of the Doha Round as a development round. China takes part in the Doha Round’ s talks on agriculture, non-agricultural goods, services, rules and other issues, submitting over 40 negotiating texts on its own and over 100 texts with other members. To promote the Doha Round talks, China repeatedly expressed its wish to make constructive contributions suited to its level of development.
In settling disputes with its trading partners, China gives consideration to the interests of all parties, and seeks common ground while shelving differences. Since China’ s entry into the WTO and with the continuous growth of its imports and exports, the number of trade disputes and frictions between China and its trading partners has increased. These cases mainly involved textile products, shoes, tires, car parts and components, steel and chemical products, and mainly covered the issues of IPR, trade balance, fair trade, food safety, environmental protection and other areas of concern. China has always preferred dialogue to confrontation, and cooperation to pressure, and chooses to settle disputes between trading partners through consultation and negotiation. China adheres to giving consideration to and balancing the interests of all parties and settling disputes through dialogue, consultation and negotiation by utilizing bilateral and multilateral channels and following the rules and under the framework of the WTO. In recent years China has adopted various measures to further open up its market, protect IPR, promote trade balance, reform the exchange rate formation mechanism of the RMB and standardize the operational order of imports and exports, among other areas, fully taking into account the concerns of its trading partners. When consultations fail to settle a dispute, China appropriately handles the issue with its trading partners through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, in order to maintain the stability of the multilateral trading system.
السادس. Realizing Sustainable Development of Foreign Trade.
At present, unbalanced, inconsistent and unsustainable development factors persist in China’s foreign trade. They are manifested in the following ways: Export growth mainly relies on the input and consumption of resources, energy, land, manpower, environment, etc., while the input of science and technology, management, innovation and other factors are insufficient, resulting in an ever more conspicuous contradiction between foreign trade development and the constraint on resource supply and environmental carrying capacity; enterprises are not competitive enough in R&D, design, marketing and services, and products with their own intellectual property rights and with their own brands account for only a small proportion of the exports; the contribution of foreign trade to China’s primary, secondary and tertiary industries is unbalanced; central and western China falls behind other regions in the scale and level of foreign trade; and foreign trade needs improvement in terms of the quality of its products and profits. The Chinese government is clearly aware of these problems and has taken active measures to accelerate the change of the development pattern of foreign trade, and achieve sustainable development.
Fostering comprehensive competitive edge of foreign trade development. In recent years, with the rising labor cost and spiraling prices of resources, energy and other production factors, the low-cost advantage of export-oriented industries has been greatly weakened. In the face of these new conditions, the Chinese government has set the strategic goal of turning the mode of foreign trade from extensive to intensive development. During the 11th Five-year Plan period (2006-2018) the Chinese government adjusted import and export taxation policies and implemented the strategies of fostering foreign trade by science and technology, market diversification and putting quality first. It launched pilot projects for transforming and upgrading processing trade, improved financial and insurance services for import and export enterprises, and encouraged enterprises to accelerate technical progress and optimize product structure. With these measures, China enhanced the comprehensive competitiveness of its foreign trade. Most import and export enterprises withstood challenges of the international financial crisis, and China’s foreign trade recovered soon after the crisis. During the 12th Five-year Plan period (2018-2018) China will make efforts to maintain its current competitive edge in exports, foster new advantages centering on technology, branding, quality and services at a faster pace, promote industrial transformation and upgrading, extend the value-added chain of processing trade, and the competitiveness and added value of enterprises and products. It will vigorously develop trade in services to promote balanced development between it and trade in goods. It will open the services trade wider to the outside world, promote service outsourcing, and try to expand the export of new services. It will improve and implement state policies in the fields of finance and taxation, banking and insurance, foreign currency management, customs clearance, inspection and quarantine, and logistics and transportation, in a bid to speed up trade and investment facilitation for the stable and healthy development of foreign trade.
Promoting energy conservation and emission reduction in foreign trade development. As early as in 1994, the Chinese government published China’s Agenda 21 - White Paper on China’s Population, Environment and Development in the 21st Century, setting goals on energy conservation and emission reduction for national economic and social development. In both the 11th and 12th five-year plans, the government made the reduction of energy consumption and CO2 emission intensity two obligatory targets. Since 2004 the Chinese government has lowered and even abolished export tax rebates for some energy-intensive, heavily-polluting and resource-based products, banned or limited the processing trade in some such products, and encouraged import and export enterprises to keep up with the world’s advanced environmental standards. As a result, in recent years such products have seen their proportion in exports decreasing, while the export of new-energy, energy-conserving and environmental-friendly products has grown by a big margin. Most import and export enterprises above a designated scale have obtained ISO14000 certification or other environmental standard certifications. China will try to readjust its economic and industrial structure, accelerate the application of advanced energy-conserving and environmental technologies, and promote more balanced development between foreign trade and resource conservation and environmental protection.
Strengthening trade-related intellectual property protection. Strengthening intellectual property protection is necessary for China to comply with its international obligations. It is also an essential move if China seeks to transform its economic growth mode and build an innovative country. The Chinese government has made tremendous efforts in this regard, and made significant progress in legislation, law enforcement, publicity, training and enhancing the social awareness of IPR protection. In 2008 China promulgated the Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy, making IPR protection a national strategy. From 2006 to 2018, China published the Action Plan on Intellectual Property Protection for six consecutive years, putting in place over 1,000 concrete measures covering the fields of legislation, law enforcement, education and training, cultural communication and exchanges with the outside world. In 2018 China filed 12,295 applications for international patents in accordance with the Patent Cooperation Treaty, registering a growth rate of 55.6percent over 2009, which was the fastest increase in the world. China also rose from the fifth to the fourth place in terms of patent application in the world. At present, it is a common challenge facing all countries to strengthen foreign trade-related intellectual property protection, and a world trend to strengthen dialogue and cooperation in this area. The Chinese government will, under related international conventions and within its own legislative framework, strengthen exchanges and cooperation with other countries and regions for the healthy development of intellectual property.
Enhancing the quality and safety requirements of export products. Generally speaking, the quality of China’s export products is constantly improving, and they are becoming more and more popular among consumers around the world. In 2009 and 2018, 11.032 million batches and 13.054 million batches, respectively, of China’s export products were examined by inspection and quarantine authorities, with only 0.15 percent and 0.14 percent being substandard; the export values totaled 429.27 billion U. S. dollars and 552.18 billion U. S. dollars, respectively, with 0.12 percent and 0.13 percent, respectively, found substandard. In 2018 China exported 127,000 batches of food to the United States, with 99.53 percent up to standard, and 138,000 batches to the European Union, with 99.78 percent up to standard. According to a report from the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of Japan on imported food, in 2018 tests on 20 percent of food imported from China found that 99.74 percent was up to standard, higher than that of food imported from the United States and European Union in the same period. However, a small number of Chinese enterprises still ignore product quality and safety to bring down cost, while some foreign importers turn a blind eye to quality and credibility, and try every means to bring down the price or even authorize Chinese producers to use substandard materials. All this harms the image of “made-in-China” منتجات. To tackle these problems, in recent years, the Chinese government has improved laws and regulations on product quality and safety, strengthened supervision at every link, and strictly investigated and punished the few enterprises that had violated laws and regulations and caused quality problems. In March 2018, China launched the Year of Improving the Quality of Foreign Trade Products, through which it aimed to improve the mechanism of approval, certification and supervision of the quality and safety of foreign trade products, thereby enhancing the quality and safety of export products.
Raising import and export enterprises’ sense of social responsibility. As China opens wider to the outside world, more and more enterprises have come to realize that along with development and expansion they should shoulder their corresponding social responsibilities. This can not only help promote social harmony and progress, but also enhance enterprises’ competitiveness and capacity for sustainable development. Advocating the Scientific Outlook on Development and the idea of a harmonious society, Chinese governments at all levels encourage enterprises to enhance their sense of social responsibility, respect labor rights, safeguard consumers’ rights and protect the ecological environment. In the meantime, the Chinese government encourages enterprises to accept relevant social responsibilities in the field of foreign trade and try to get necessary certifications. Since the new Law on Labor Contracts and its implementation regulations took effect in 2008, import and export enterprises have established the system of “five insurances” (old-age insurance, medical insurance, unemployment insurance, work injury insurance and maternity insurance), as well as a housing fund. The Chinese government regards it as an important task in the course of promoting foreign trade transformation and upgrading to enhance enterprises’ sense of social responsibility. It is therefore determined to strengthen publicity and training in this regard, establish and improve a management system marked by integrity for import and export enterprises, improve public supervision on enterprises to make sure they fulfill their social responsibilities, carry out international cooperation in fostering and managing enterprises’ sense of social responsibility, and call on import and export enterprises to constantly enhance their performance in this regard.
Promoting international cooperation in emerging industries of strategic importance. To develop new strategic industries is of great significance for China to realize foreign trade transformation and upgrading, and sustainable development. After over 30 years of reform and opening up, China has seen its overall strength grow remarkably, its science and technology advancing and its industrial system improving markedly, laying a solid foundation for the development of emerging industries of strategic importance. However, compared to developed countries, these industries in China are still in their infancy. In the wake of the 2008 international financial crisis, all the world’s major economies have been developing emerging industries at a faster pace, and China has taken the development of these industries as an important task in the course of its industrial rejuvenation. To promote the priority areas, while giving play to the basic role of the market in allocating resources, the Chinese government has strengthened its policy guidance, regulated market order, improved its investment environment and encouraged enterprises to enhance their technological innovation capabilities. This basic policy of supporting emerging industries of strategic importance conforms to international trade rules. China is willing to strengthen communication with other countries in scientific research, technological development and capacity building, and work with them to create a new situation for international cooperation and development in emerging industries.
At present, the underlying impact of the international financial crisis, the protracted, arduous and complicated nature of the world economic recovery is manifesting itself, and the global economic structure and trade layout face in-depth readjustment. China will make new adjustments to its foreign trade, in an effort to turn foreign trade from scale expansion to quality and profit improvement, and from mainly relying on its low-cost advantage to enhancing its comprehensive competitive edge, thereby turning China from a big trading country to a strong trading power.
China’s foreign trade is still hampered by many uncertainties and is bound to meet new difficulties and challenges. During the 12th Five-year Plan period China will open itself wider to the outside world as a driver for further reform, development and innovation, make full use of its advantages, strengthen international cooperation in all respects, and integrate itself into the world economy on a wider scale and at a higher level. China is willing to work with its trading partners to cope with the various challenges facing the world economy and trade, and promote its foreign trade to realize a more balanced, coordinated and sustainable development, and share prosperity and mutually-beneficial results with its trading partners.

The Evolution of China's International Trade Policy: Development Through Protection and Liberalization.
THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY: DEVELOPMENT THROUGH PROTECTION AND LIBERALIZATION, Economic Development through World Trade, Y. S. Lee, ed., pp. 191-213, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2007.
23 Pages Posted: 29 Apr 2008.
JiangYu Wang.
National University of Singapore (NUS) - Faculty of Law.
The rapid rise of China is quickly reshaping the world economy. From the perspectives of trade and development, what explains China's remarkable growth? With respect to the nature and impact of its trade and investment policy, China remains a puzzle to many observers and continues to be topic for heated debate. The primary purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the evolution of China's foreign trade policy from a trade and development perspective. Examining some of the key developments in China's trade policy and regime, it argues that neither free trade nor protectionsim is the complete answer to development; in China's experience, a "pragmatic" trade policy requires a delicate balance between liberalization and use of industrial policy to support selected economic sectors.
Keywords: China, international trade, foreign trade, trade policy, trade liberalization, trade protection.
JEL Classification: F13, L52, O19, K33.
JiangYu Wang (Contact Author)
National University of Singapore (NUS) - Faculty of Law ( email )
469G Bukit Timah Road.
Eu Tong Sen Building.
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Trade Policy in the 1990s.
Trade Policy in the 1990s.
Trade was important in the 1990s. Both opponents and proponents agree that trade was much in our national consciousness, in our domestic politics, in our economic performance and in our diplomatic relations. Many of the major trade achievements of the 1990s will leave their mark for years to come.
Trade takes place at the interface of domestic politics, economic policy, and foreign policy, and has an intimate relationship with international finance. Below, I organize my reflections on trade in the 1990s around these poles, hopefully without losing the complexity of the interrelationship among them. I also provide a brief discussion of the process of trade policymaking in the 1990’s, which reflected the multifaceted nature of the enterprise to a degree not achieved earlier.
The 1990s opened with the US in a defensive crouch on competitiveness and a broad political consensus that the US needed to be more aggressive in promoting its commercial interests. This posture changed dramatically over the decade, as the US regained international preeminence in the industries emerging as growth drivers and in macroeconomic performance. By the end of the 1990s, America had compiled one of the most impressive records seen in decades on forging trade agreements with key regional and bilateral partners and providing leadership on the multilateral trading system, with profound implications for economic and foreign policy.
In security policy, the big event of the last decade was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. In international economics, the big event of the 1990s was the decline of Japan and the associated “Asian model” of capitalism. By the middle of the decade, the US found itself in an unexpectedly dominant—some would say hegemonic—position in the international economy, due to a combination of unexpected, rapid decline in Japan and resurgence at home. At the same time, the “Washington consensus” recipe for growth was increasingly adopted around the world. This presented the US with opportunities that scarcely could have been imagined in the previous decade, but equally with responsibilities on the global stage. In parallel, the domestic debate on trade grew increasingly polarized, in great part because of the very success of the trade agenda and America’s newfound dominance. So the United States concluded the decade in a position of unchallenged economic dominance on the global scene, but simultaneously beset by popular opposition to trade.
The “Globalization” Challenge: The U. S. Role in Shaping World Trade and Investment.
U. S.-China Economic Relations: Implications for U. S. Policy.
Why are interest rates so low, part 3: The Global Savings Glut.
The result was unevenness. Sometimes, the United States seized the opportunities and took ambitious leadership positions, finalizing the Uruguay Round, NAFTA, and global agreements in telecommunications, financial services, and information technology, launching the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), elevating the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, driving the international financial rescue of Mexico and later of East Asia, negotiating the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the US-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement, and brokering China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). But sometimes, the polarization at home led to paralysis abroad, most notably with the collapse of WTO negotiations in Seattle and the symbolically important defeat of fast track in 1997. And in those instances where US domestic politics got in the way of exerting leadership, rivals were only too happy to step in, most notably the European Union (EU) on the WTO and Japan in Asia.
الكتب ذات الصلة.
Trade Profiles 2017.
Profils Commerciaux 2017.
Perfiles Comerciales2017.
The course of trade policy over the 1990s was integrally shaped by the interaction with the overall state of the economy—as it had been, in mirror image, during the 1980s. When the Clinton administration entered office in 1993, the overriding imperative was the “economy, stupid.” America’s economic posture abroad was overwhelmingly colored by the realities of the 1980s: severe macroeconomic imbalance associated with loose fiscal policy and tight monetary policy and severe erosion of international market share and “competitiveness” in key manufacturing sectors. Japan was seen as the major competitive threat to be challenged where possible and imitated where not. In fact, one of the main points of agreement among the Clinton administration’s new economic team coming into office was that with the Cold War over, American policymakers could take off their gloves vis-a-vis Japan.
But just as in the 1980s’, America’s twin deficits and dollar overshooting contributed centrally to a loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis Asian rivals, so too in the 1990s, trade developments were heavily conditioned by the Clinton administration’s commitment to fiscal discipline and the stunning performance of the information technology sector in the United States, as well as the deepening economic slump in Japan. By the mid 1990s, US economic performance was strong—with trade making a significant contribution. On a sectoral level, it was becoming clear that the industries where the US was on the cutting edge were increasingly dominating economic performance all over the globe.
The resulting confidence left room for trade advances across a variety of fronts. And it put the US in a position to act as a stable anchor in the international financial system, first in the Mexican peso crisis of 1995 and later in the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, helping to support accelerated recoveries and to maintain the commitment to open trade regimes.
Lael Brainard.
Member - Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
And expanding trade in turn contributed centrally to America’s stellar performance. In the early to mid 1990s, trade was an important stimulant to growth. But as the decade progressed, trade’s contribution was increasingly as a brake on inflation, probably providing the Federal Reserve a little more leeway in navigating its way through the financial crisis in 1998.
It is also important to assess progress on the goal of advancing open trade as an economic policy in its own right. The record of the Clinton administration on trade is very strong—perhaps not compared with the economist’s ideal of free trade but certainly when compared with previous administrations facing similar political constraints. Although the administration’s early rhetoric could have been construed as favoring results-oriented managed trade, in fact the record is strongest on forging market opening agreements and quite respectable on managing trade disputes and trade remedies. By any measure, the trade record in the 1990s stacks up very well against the 1980s—despite polarization in the domestic debate. A combination of factors contributed to this record of achievement, including America’s economic resurgence and the sea change in attitudes towards trade in Latin America and other developing countries, but some credit must be given to President Clinton and the extraordinary group of people he selected to make trade policy.
When it comes to market opening agreements, it is hard not to recognize the momentous achievements of the 1990s. The Reagan Administration initiated the Uruguay Round and negotiated the US-Canada FTA and the US-Israel FTA, and the Bush Administration initiated NAFTA. In comparison, the Clinton administration concluded negotiation and achieved legislative passage of both NAFTA and the Uruguay Round, concluded WTO agreements on telecommunications, financial services, and information technology, launched negotiations toward the FTAA and a free trade agreement with Chile, negotiated a free trade agreement with Jordan, secured legislative approval of significantly expanded Caribbean trade preferences and a generous new trade preference program with Africa, and negotiated and won legislative approval for China’s entry into the WTO.
Free trade purists tend to critique the Clinton administration’s market opening record as too ambitious rather than too modest, citing the eager pursuit of a “spaghetti bowl” of free trade agreements. In fact, there were two big developments on this front: NAFTA and the commitment to pursue an FTAA starting with Chile. In both cases, the agreements would seem to meet all of the criteria that economists believe make trade agreements more likely to be building blocks than stumbling blocks to multilateral free trade. Although the US-Jordan agreement does not fit this mold, surely it should be seen primarily as an instrument of foreign policy rather than of trade policy, like the US-Israel FTA that went before it.
Trade Remedies and Protection.
Many economists judge any implementation of trade remedies as effectively protectionist and antitrade. Those who live in the world of policy and politics make finer distinctions. First, there is a vast difference between implementing protectionist measures on an ad hoc basis and doing so in accordance with US trade laws and WTO rules. Second, there is a strong political rationale for our trade remedy statutes as a safety valve, helping support a remarkably open trade regime overall. Indeed, it is likely that the only politically feasible alternative would be a regime that builds in comparable insurance by maintaining higher levels of bound protection across the board.
With these provisos, the Clinton Administration’s performance was strong—especially in contrast to the 1980s. The 1980s witnessed a series of ad hoc mechanisms restricting imports in a number of politically important industries: steel quotas covering 27 countries, quotas on Japanese car imports, a worldwide price cartel on semiconductors, restraints on machine tool imports, and quotas on Canadian softwood lumber imports (although the Reagan administration also ended the Orderly Marketing Agreement in the footwear industry). In nearly all cases, the protection was instituted outside the framework of US trade laws, and in many cases, findings under the statutory processes were ignored or rejected.
In contrast, the Clinton administration early on made clear that it saw strong implementation of US trade laws—in accordance with international obligations—as an integral component of sustaining domestic support for the international trading system. In practice, this meant that the President took action in all cases where the ITC recommended it, from the minute broomcorn broom industry to the powerful steel industry. But the Administration refrained from imposing protectionist measures outside the context of the legal process (with the sole exception of two agricultural cases with Canada, where it extended negotiated solutions established under previous administrations).
>Perhaps the most prominent example differentiating the Clinton administration’s approach is the case of steel. The Asian financial crisis was in full swing when the US steel industry was thrown into crisis, with layoffs affecting fully 10 percent of the workforce, capacity utilization plummeting, and firms filing bankruptcy. The industry pursued a strategy centered on antidumping cases, in parallel with an all-out effort to secure legislation imposing worldwide quotas on steel imports. The Clinton administration responded with aggressive implementation of the antidumping laws and intense engagement on industry adjustment measures, but early on made clear they would veto any quota legislation inconsistent with WTO rules. Because of concern over the fragility of international financial markets, the Clinton administration steadfastly resisted taking any extralegal measures or even self-initiating a safeguards case—even when the steel quota legislation passed in the House by a bipartisan vote of 289 to 141. President Clinton’s position—which would later have consequences for America’s negotiating position in Seattle and for the China Permanent Normalized Trade Relations (PNTR) vote—stands in sharp contrast to actions by previous administrations.
Trade Disputes and Unilateralism.
During the 1980s, there was increasing sentiment in Congress and among policy experts that the multilateral trading rules were inadequate to address key foreign barriers faced by US firms because the dispute settlement system was weak, “hidden” barriers were not subject to trade disciplines, and key trade partners such as China remained outside the rules. Indeed, the single biggest piece of trade legislation produced during the 1980s, the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act, mandated action to address systematic unfair trade barriers under the so-called Super 301 provision. This legislation and US attempts to deal with barriers in Japan and South Korea led to growing international concern about US unilateralism in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
When the Clinton administration assumed office in 1993, it placed significant emphasis on taking aggressive action to deal with trade barriers abroad. And indeed, 1993 to 1995 witnessed several high profile bilateral negotiations, first with Japan in the context of the US-Japan Framework, and then with China. Concerns about US unilateralism spread to Europe and Canada with the passage of the Helms-Burton Cuba sanctions legislation in 1996, whose provisions were alleged to impose a burden of extraterritoriality.
But beginning with the passage of the Uruguay Round legislation in 1994 and the associated strengthening of the WTO dispute settlement system, there was an important change in America’s approach. The Clinton administration determined to pursue trade disputes through the WTO system; although the administration continued to invoke Section 301, in fact all Section 301 actions were pursued in parallel with—and subject to—WTO rulings. Perhaps the most striking example is the Kodak-Fuji case, where the Administration terminated the action under Section 301 following a WTO loss. Exceptions to this rule were limited to cases against China, because it remained outside the WTO, as well as intellectual property cases mandated under the statutory “special 301” standards, where eligibility requirements for US trade preference programs exceed WTO standards.
Some free trade purists have criticized the aggressive use of the WTO dispute settlement system. However, the Clinton administration consciously adopted a policy of availing itself of the mechanisms available under international law in order to affirm the primacy of the multilateral system and to demonstrate to domestic critics that the United States could use the new system to advance its interests. This strategy came under attack from Congress and domestic interests when the US won cases at the WTO only to find its trade partners, and particularly the EU, opting for retaliation rather than implement changes to the disputed provisions. For its part, the US established a record of coming into compliance with adverse WTO rulings, but this may prove more difficult in the months ahead.
Foreign Policy and International Financial Policy.
The Clinton administration entered office with a stated determination to end the perceived subordination of trade policy to security, reflecting the end of the Cold War and the need to address America’s relative economic decline. In the early years, this policy was given concrete expression in a series of high profile trade disputes with Japan. But over the course of eight years in office, several new developments pushed in the direction of mutual reinforcement between international economic policy and security policy (with notable exceptions in the areas of sanctions and export controls). Perhaps most important, the turnaround in the US economic position permitted a reorientation of the trade agenda more in the direction of pursuing opportunities rather than redressing inequities. Second, President Clinton, who entered office with a much stronger vision and mandate on domestic and economic policy than on foreign policy, gradually developed a strong interest in foreign policy and a keen instinct for using economic tools to advance US interests abroad. And third, the international financial system presented critical challenges that dominated trade policymaking at several key junctures.
Ultimately, the Clinton administration was able to advance US core economic and security interests in tandem on several fronts: in the Western Hemisphere, in East Asia, and to some degree with Africa. The relationship with Japan improved over time, because of the sharp change in the relative economic positions of the US and Japan and due to a course correction by the Administration. The Clinton administration can also be credited with providing important international leadership on systemic issues, helping to strengthen the multilateral trading system and to galvanize international financial stabilization. But the administration ended with some notable failures as well, bequeathing to its successor a dispute-riddled relationship with the EU and doubt abroad about whether America could muster the political will to continue providing international leadership on trade.
The early years of the Clinton administration were a defining time for the US relationship with Mexico—America’s most important economic relationship with a middle income country because of the 2000 mile shared land border. The first challenge confronting the new Administration was determining how to handle the endgame on NAFTA given a hostile Congress and strong opposition within the Democratic Party. The Clinton administration followed a strategy of elaborating the agreement to address areas of particular concern to Democrats and then waging an all-out effort to secure passage, on the strength of claims about NAFTA’s job creation potential in the US. Scarcely a year later, Mexico plummeted into the most severe financial crisis in its history. With the support of the congressional leadership, President Clinton used executive authority to assemble the biggest ever financial rescue package, in the face of broad opposition from the American people and Congress. Mexican President Zedillo’s tenacity and strong economic policies made the investment one of the best of its kind. Moreover, the framework of rules mandated by NAFTA held strong throughout the financial crisis, helping Mexico to recover in record time.
From a foreign policy vantage point, these policies were a clear win. They fundamentally transformed the relationship with Mexico, putting in place an economic framework that will govern relations for years to come and will form the basis for a hemisphere-wide system of trade and investment rules. But the fight over NAFTA and the sharp deterioration in trade balances following the peso crisis galvanized a powerful coalition of trade opponents and generated a fierce backlash on trade that, perhaps more than any other single factor, helped defeat fast track in 1997 and undermine the Seattle trade talks in 2000.
Spurred in part by the competitive dynamic set off by NAFTA and in part by a profound change in Latin American attitudes toward market liberalization, the US was able to put in place an ambitious negotiating agenda towards the goal of achieving FTAA by 2005. Although hard issues such as agriculture subsidies and antidumping will not be addressed until the endgame of the negotiations, the ambitious trade goals and the initiation of a regularized hemisphere-wide Summit process are major achievements in US relations with the Caribbean, Central America and Latin America, in a clear case where trade and security interests proceed in tandem.
In the early days of the administration, the policy that most united the international economic team was broad determination to achieve concrete sectoral results with Japan. Major emphasis was placed on the US-Japan Framework negotiations aimed at addressing impediments in important Japanese sectors where US market share was low. There is little doubt that this put strains on the overall relationship with this key ally. But even as the Clinton administration approached the moment of peak tension with Japan, threatening the threat of punitive sanctions to exact concessions on opening Japan’s auto and auto parts market, Japan’s economy was slipping into a severe and protracted slump.
The turnaround in the relationship to Japan and the trade agenda bears analogy to the breathtaking demise of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War. Starting with the rapid turnaround in the relative economic positions of Japan and the US, and reinforced by the challenge to the Japanese model of capitalism posed by the Asian financial crisis, America’s trade agenda was turned on its head. By early 1998, trade disputes had taken a back seat to the imperative of prodding Japan’s supine economy back to life. Although trade negotiations continued on key areas of US priority (telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, insurance and autos) the tenor became more muted, and greater weight was placed on the overall relationship and the common security agenda. The contrast can be seen in President Clinton’s bookend visits to Japan in 1993 and 2000. When President Clinton traveled to Japan in 1993 for his first G7 meeting, Japan’s trade barriers and US imbalances topped the agenda. When President Clinton traveled to Japan in 2000 for his final G7/8 meeting, the US and Japan collaborated closely on a major new effort to address development challenges including HIV/AIDs, the digital divide, primary education and debt relief and a showcase agreement on information technology.
The Clinton administration also made a major breakthrough on relations with China through trade policy, after several years of rocky relations on the security and trade fronts. The early years were characterized by a series of high profile trade disputes that culminated in a landmark intellectual property agreement signed under the threat of sanctions. Although the administration early on identified WTO accession as one of the few levers available to the US for influencing China’s development and advancing the rule of law, negotiations did not intensify in earnest until the Chinese leadership, in particular Premier Zhu Rongji, embraced WTO membership as a critical complement to the domestic reform agenda and determined that the US would be the key broker of a deal.
The terms of China’s entry into the WTO will have a profound impact on US-China relations, on the terms of China’s integration into the international economy, and on the WTO itself for years to come. On the other hand, several interactions between trade and foreign policy are worth noting. First, President Clinton’s decision to actively pursue Congressional approval for PNTR before the WTO accession process was completed and during his final year in office, which was critical to the breakthrough with China, incurred heavy political costs and displaced other trade legislation priorities such as fast track. Second, as is common in trade negotiations, the twists and turns in the negotiations with China—reflecting domestic politics on both sides—severely strained the relationship. Third, it is clear that the endgame on the China WTO negotiations, coming as they did in November 2000, distracted high level attention from the Seattle WTO preparations at a critical time.
South Korea and ASEAN.
With respect to relations with South Korea and the ASEAN nations, President Clinton early on signaled the importance he attached to these relationships by elevating APEC to an annual summit process and by pursuing an ambitious trade liberalization agenda within APEC. But ultimately, it was the Asian financial crisis that defined the tenor of US relationships in East Asia and to some degree even APEC.
Three things are notable here as they relate to the interaction of international economic and foreign policy. First, although it is widely recognized that the US played a key leadership role on financial stabilization in Asia, foreign perceptions of America’s role suffered from the highly partisan debate over the US financial contribution to the IMF and America’s inability to pledge financing for Thailand, a treaty ally, due to restrictions on the Exchange Stabilization Fund imposed during the peso crisis. Second, analogous to the course of many trade negotiations, although our security agenda is well served by coming to the aid of friends and allies at times of financial crisis, the “take your medicine” tenor of America’s involvement implicates America in the onus associated with strict IMF conditionality, which can place strains on our relationships. Third, trade policy was an integral part of the rapid recovery from crisis. Although there was some experimentation with financial conditions, no crisis country deviated significantly from its open trade commitments. And the strength of the US economy, coupled with President Clinton’s commitment to maintain open markets, made a central contribution to recovery—despite recession in Japan and low growth in Europe.
The Poorest Nations.
Over the course of the 1990s, trade preference programs for developing countries were significantly expanded, starting with expansion of the Generalized System of Preferences for the poorest countries, extending to the proposal for Southeast Europe Trade Preferences and culminating in the expansion of Caribbean Basin preferences to approximate parity with NAFTA and the creation of a new preference program for Africa. Africa deserves particular attention; the Clinton administration elevated trade and investment relations with the nations of Africa to a degree not seen before as part of a broader effort to develop a new framework of partnership with Africa. Moreover, these efforts were complemented by initiatives on debt forgiveness for the poorest, massive increases in spending on the infectious disease crisis in developing countries, and modest increases in spending on basic education. But it is worth noting that it took years to bring the trade initiatives to fruition because of opposition from key domestic interests. And the Clinton administration was unable to obtain congressional approval for sufficient funding to help the poorest countries realize the full potential of expanded trade access or to make sufficient offers of expanded market access to turn the tide in Seattle.
With respect to the EU, the best that might be said is that the Clinton administration succeeded in deepening and broadening the overall relationship with the EU and key European allies at a time of deepening integration, despite a series of high stake trade disputes. The US and EU have a pattern of testing the limits of the world trade dispute settlement system and then trying to fix the system in a subsequent negotiating round. The past decade was no exception. But the escalation to the point where America now faces a WTO ruling reaching into the minutiae of domestic tax law that could result in billions of dollars of retaliation despite an apparent lack of any clear EU constituency who is harmed by the alleged violations puts some strain on the relationship and on domestic support for the trading system more generally.
Separately, substantial progress was made on identifying policies that could significantly facilitate trade and investment ties across the Atlantic. The launch of the Transatlantic Economic Partnership, the efforts of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, and the substantial progress on achieving mutual recognition of product standards have yielded commercially important outcomes.
Many see the 1990s as a watershed in the politics of trade. But any such analysis should make a distinction between politicization of the public debate as opposed to congressional activity. My assessment is that there was much greater intensity around trade issues in the public debate and greater activism on globalization generally, but the congressional politics of trade were not greatly changed.
Certainly, public awareness of trade rose in the 1990s, as did activism among NGOs and students. In the United States, this trend reflected two converging forces. First, a powerful alliance of interests was formed in the crucible of the fight against NAFTA, bringing together disparate groups from the left and right. NAFTA provoked intense opposition and backlash because it was the first attempt at deep integration with a low wage country, Mexico’s geographical proximity made the consequences more concrete, and the public conflated NAFTA’s impact with the surge in imports and immigration associated with the peso crisis. Subsequently, the same coalition succeeded in defeating fast track in 1997 (although they did not prevail in the votes on fast track in 1994, the Uruguay Round, or China PNTR). What is most interesting about the NAFTA and fast track debates is that trade opponents—and particularly the labor union movement—struck a chord that resonated with the American people by raising questions about the distributional consequences of trade agreements.
Second, there was a striking increase in activism among groups opposing globalization. Initially, the activism was organized around particular goals, such as the anti-sweatshop movement on college campuses, debt forgiveness for the poorest countries, and addressing the HIV/AIDs crisis in Africa. But starting with the Seattle WTO protests in 2000 and continuing with every international meeting since then, anti-globalization has become a rallying cry for a much more diffuse set of interests. Ironically, this loose movement is itself a product of the globalization of ideas.
It is more difficult to see evidence that the congressional politics of trade were much changed in the 1990s or that partisanship increased. If anything, the partisan lineup may have softened modestly, with greater numbers of moderate Democrats voting in favor of trade and greater numbers of Republicans voting against trade for ideological or constituency reasons. For instance, 42 percent of House Republicans voted in favor of steel quotas in 1998 and 26 percent opposed China PNTR in 2000.
TRADE VOTES IN THE 1990’S.
مجلس النواب.
Disapprove Fast Track 91.
WTO Withdrawal Sec. 125.
Disapprove Fast Track 91.
1. Includes independents.
Although critics allege that the congressional trade consensus eroded during the 1990s, it is worth noting that the singular accomplishment of this so-called consensus during the 1980s was the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act, whose provisions were more notable in the area of fair trade than that of trade opening. Moreover, the partisan lineup on fast track does not look enormously different between the Bush and Clinton administrations. Contrasting the Bush fast track vote of 1991 with the Clinton fast track vote of 1994, it is worth noting that only 13 percent of Democrats in the House and 43 percent in the Senate supported fast track in 1991, compared with 59 percent in the House and 76 percent in the Senate in 1994. Republican support in the House held steady at 87 percent and rose slightly in the Senate from 88 to 90 percent. (Fast track never came to a vote in the House in 1997, so there are no official tallies, and the 1998 fast track vote in the House is not a useful benchmark, since it was widely recognized to be a political vote and there was no concerted effort to build support).
Indeed, when one compares the tallies for trade votes in the 1990s, the most important factor distinguishing successes from failures appears to be whether there were calculable concrete benefits in the offing sufficient to galvanize supporters. A simple comparison makes the case. In 1997, with no trade agreement pending, fast track failed in the House, but in 1994, when the hard won gains of the Uruguay Round hung in the balance, the vote was 295 to 125 in the House, with 59 percent of Democrats in support. Similarly, in 2000, the China PNTR vote succeeded, despite the unpopularity of trade votes in election years, because of the strength of the underlying trade agreement with China.
Finally, it is worth noting briefly the distinctive way in which trade policy was coordinated during the Clinton administration. President Clinton entered office determined to strengthen international economic policymaking by establishing a new White House coordinating body. Despite numerous turf battles, variations in leadership styles and structure, and limited resources, the National Economic Council evolved a viable, effective model for integrating the competing considerations that go into international economic policymaking and coordinating the diverse institutional actors. The quality of the process and the participants helped ensure an overall logic and consistency between policies, strengthened the voice of policy officials within the overall decisionmaking process, and elevated the profile of trade issues. Over the course of the administration, the International Economic Deputies evolved as a policy development body that helped tee up policy recommendations and oversee consistent implementation. And at the Principals level, coordination evolved over time as a shared responsibility between the National Economic and National Security Advisers in close consultation with the Chief of Staff.
Lessons of the 1990s.
The last decade presents a rich period for the study of trade policy. Below, I briefly suggest several lessons that can be drawn from the experience of the 1990s, although more systematic study in the future will no doubt yield a more definitive list:
Negotiating a trade agreement is like planning a wedding. Although economic and security interests may be closely aligned at the outset, the process of negotiating the agreement tends to be dominated on each side by domestic commercial and political considerations (the in-laws) that can at least temporarily strain diplomatic relations. And the ultimate agreement may have some negative foreign policy consequences or generate domestic political backlash that makes future trade liberalization more difficult. For that reason, it is important for a new administration to prioritize and sequence carefully. Don’t go for fast track unless there is a locomotive. Fast track in the abstract is a hard sell. Asking Congress for an open-ended grant of authority to pursue trade agreements whose benefits are as yet undefined and far into the future is a recipe for trouble. A powerful coalition of trade opponents has demonstrated that they can mobilize effectively to oppose trade legislation. But supporters are only galvanized to mount a full-fledged offensive when there are concrete benefits in the offing. The President is well served by instituting a White House process for coordinating international economic policy. Because of its growing complexity, trade policy affects a diverse set of interests and has a relatively large number of institutional players, making the payoff to coordination very high. It is very risky for the US to host major international ministerials or summits while at the same time pursuing an ambitious agenda. Far better for the US to work closely with a more neutral host. Don’t create separate trade adjustment assistance programs associated with particular trade agreements. Trade adjustment assistance is a critical complement to any trade liberalization initiative, particularly in light of the inadequacy of America’s general social insurance for dealing with the distributional consequences of trade. However, there are both political and efficiency reasons to maintain a single overarching trade adjustment assistance program.

China and the World Trading System.
Attached is the full text of the speech delivered by WTO Director-General, Renato Ruggiero, earlier today (21 April) at Beijing University, China.
There is a simple reality which lies at the heart of our current negotiations and the real challenges of adjustment we all face: the reality that China is already a leading power in an ever more interdependent global economy. China increasingly needs the opportunities and security of the WTO system to fulfil its huge potential for growth and development. And the WTO increasingly needs China as a full and active member to be a truly universal system.
This reality is emphasized by the sheer force of China's rise in the world. During the last decade, output has been expanding by an average of 10 per cent a year, while merchandise export volume has been growing even faster, at about 15 per cent. In two decades, the value of China's merchandise exports has expanded more than twenty-fold, reaching US$151 billion last year. China is already the world's fifth largest trading power, and the second largest recipient of foreign investment. Today the Chinese economy represents between 5 to 10 per cent of global output, depending on the method used to calculate national production.
As China's economy expands into the future, so too will its ties to the global economy. Dependence on export markets will continue to grow rapidly, and not only for labour intensive products like footwear and toys, but for the higher technology goods and services that are an increasing proportion of China's output as it climbs up the production ladder. Imports will also rise, in part to fuel further industrialization and modernization, but also in response to consumer demand. And an ever expanding web of inward and outward investment will draw China deeper into the global financial system.
It is estimated that China's modernization will require imports of equipment and technology of about US$100 billion annually, and infrastructure expenditures during the latter half of this decade could amount to about US$250 billion. This is not to mention rising demand for energy, mineral resources, food and farming imports, which, despite the size and resources of the Chinese economy, cannot be satisfied by domestic output alone.
The basic fact is that China is moving to the very centre of the globalization process, and both China and other nations are benefiting from it. We live in a world where technology, capital, and trade move increasingly more freely; where the old economic tools have lost their edge; and where economic strength and security increasingly depend on economic openness and integration. China's path to growth and modernization is also a path to interdependence.
This process of globalization will not be reversed - it will accelerate. Throughout the world, economic and technological forces are breaking down walls, reaching across borders, and weaving together a single world economy. In the late twentieth century our new opportunities, as well as our challenges - in trade, in economics, in every facet of international politics - arise from our worlds moving closer together, not further apart. Deepening interdependence is the central reality for China and for the world. Managing interdependence is our shared responsibility.
A key step towards completing this interdependence is bringing China into the multilateral trading system. China's economic relations with the world are simply too large and too pervasive to manage effectively through a maze of arbitrary, shifting and unstable bilateral deals. China's best guarantee of coherent and consistent international trade policies is to be found inside the rules-based multilateral system.
By the same token, China, like all other countries, can best manage its growing economic relations with the world on the basis of rights and obligations agreed by consensus and reflected in enforceable rules and disciplines. This is the only way to resist bilateral pressures or threats of unilateral actions. It is also the only way to sustain and promote domestic economic reform knowing that China's efforts in this direction are being matched by its trading partners, members of the WTO, who share the same obligations under the WTO Agreements.
Joining the WTO means assuming binding obligations in respect of import policies - obligations which will necessitate an adjustment in China's trade policies and, in most cases, economic restructuring. But, in turn, China will benefit from the extension to it of all the advantages that have been negotiated among the 130 members of the WTO. It will be entitled to export its products and services to the markets of other WTO members at the rates of duty and levels of commitment negotiated in the Uruguay Round - this includes tariff bindings benefiting nearly 100 per cent of China's exports of industrial products to developed countries, with almost one-half of these products being subject to duty-free treatment. These tremendous market access opportunities will be underpinned and reinforced by the two cardinal principles of most-favoured-nation and non-discrimination.
Equally importantly, China will have recourse to a multilateral forum for discussing trade problems with its WTO partners and, if necessary, to a binding dispute settlement procedure if its rights are impaired. This greater level of security will benefit China immensely - encouraging even greater business confidence, and attracting even greater levels of investment.
There is a third major reason for China's participation in the multilateral system. Only inside the system can China take part in writing the trade rules of the 21st century. This will be an unprecedented set of rights and obligations negotiated internationally by consensus.
The enduring power of the multilateral system is its power to evolve. In 1994 we concluded the Uruguay Round of the GATT which, at the time, was the most ambitious and far-reaching agreement in the fifty year history of the international economic system. Just three years later, we have moved on to negotiate path-breaking agreements to liberalize the global telecommunications industry and to remove tariffs on trade in information technology products - the combined value of which, at some US$1 trillion, matches global trade in agriculture, autos, and textiles combined. And their value reaches beyond trade figures; by opening up access to knowledge, communication and their technologies we are opening up access to the most important raw materials of the new century. This will be of immense importance to the development and competitiveness of all economies, not least China's.
There is every sign that we can also conclude a multilateral agreement on financial services by the end of this year - another area in which we are trading into the future. And this is to say nothing of the WTO negotiations on agriculture, services and other sectors, that will resume in three years time.
An outward-looking China cannot afford to stand on the sidelines while others write the rules of the game. A China with growing export interests cannot afford to be left without secure and expanding access to global markets - security which only the multilateral system provides. And perhaps most important, a China dependent upon technology and modernization cannot afford to fall behind the fast-moving pace of globalization - particularly in sectors like information technologies, telecommunication, or financial services which will be the key building blocks of the new economy.
China's economic success so far is directly linked to its impressive domestic reforms, including trade and investment liberalization. China has already benefited from the unilateral tariff reductions offered in the context of its accession negotiations; one study puts the gains at US$22 billion. But this is not the end of the road. Further liberalization - undertaken on the basis of WTO rules, and in exchange for benefits from other WTO partners - could prove the biggest stimulus yet to China's economic growth. And, by extension, a giant stimulus to the world economy.
I am not suggesting that joining the WTO is a simple step. Just the opposite. But many other countries that are already members of the WTO share a comparable level of development with China. They have subscribed to its rights and obligations and enjoy its benefits. The other accession candidates are also showing they have made the same choice.
The attraction of the WTO lies precisely in the strength and consistency of its rights and obligations - which we continue to broaden and deepen with the further expansion and integration of the global economy. Fifty years ago the focus was only on tariffs and other border measures; today WTO rules extend well inside the border, to encompass technical standards, services, intellectual property, trade-related investment, and a host of other economic policies that were once considered domestic. Fifty years ago, almost all GATT members were from the industrialized world; of today's 130 WTO members, eighty per cent are developing countries or economies in transition.
The growing complexity of the rules and diversity of membership, far from weakening the WTO, has strengthened it. In moving to broader participation we have done more than add a new rule here or a new member there. We have created an expanding network of interlocking interests and responsibilities - a system which grows more vital to all our trading interests as it grows stronger.
It is because China's accession to the WTO will profoundly shape the future evolution and direction of global economic relations that we must get the process right. China is too large and important an economic player - and its entry into the WTO will have too great an impact on the system - to compromise these negotiations.
We have recently seen important signs of momentum and creative flexibility we have recently seen in these negotiations - in difficult areas like trading rights, non discrimination, non tariff barriers, state trading, investment, and intellectual property where the negotiators have made quite remarkable progress, especially in recent months. None of this progress would have been possible without the vital - if time-consuming - technical groundwork that all parties to this negotiation have laid over the previous decade. But what is really driving this process forward is a shared recognition of the rewards that are riding on success.
My purpose is not to underestimate the work before us, especially as we approach the next negotiating session scheduled in May this year. Like all negotiations, much of the important work - and the toughest issues - have been left to the end. My purpose instead is to urge all concerned to redouble their efforts - and to stretch their imaginations - now that we can claim to be entering the final phase and there is a widely shared need to move forward with urgency. There still remain crucial issues pertaining to China's terms of accession to the WTO. Equally important, there are the bilateral market accession negotiations with China's major trading partners which, as you know, are a critical and essential element of any successful negotiation. Once again we should recall that China's position as the 5th world exporter reinforces the need for its own market to be accessible to others. These are all important issues that will need to be resolved to everyone's satisfaction before China can be brought into the WTO.
Throughout the period of China's accession process, the GATT/WTO Secretariat has been ready to facilitate negotiations and to render any assistance which may be needed on all possible fronts. I need hardly add that this commitment of the Secretariat stands equally firm as we approach the final stages of the accession process.
The challenges ahead do not alter the basic reality that no aspect of China's economic and trade relations will be easier to handle outside the multilateral system. On the contrary, everything would be more difficult, for China and its partners - more arbitrary, discriminatory and power-based. No-one can want such a scenario.
The international debate about globalization vividly illustrates this last point. Implicity or explicitly, China is moving to the very centre of this debate. The wonder is not that the accession negotiations have been so long and so complex. The wonder is that this immense country has moved so far into the mainstream of the global economy in so short a time.
The walls that divided us are falling down; but some still see disparities and differences, rather than our common interests. Globalization is weaving the world together as never before; but it is a world of different cultures, different systems, and different levels of development.
Interdependence demands that we respect our unique cultures and civilizations. Interdependence also demands that we find common solutions to our common problems. These include the concerns of China's major trading partners about its persistent trade surpluses. Equally, the world will have to understand the immense challenge China faces in transforming itself with a modern and competitive society - and all in a matter of decades. China is not alone in making this effort of restructuring. Globalization obliges all nations, small or large, rich or poor, to take part in a continuous process of adjustment. More than ever before, the world's problems will be China's problems; and China's problems will be the world's.
Yet our world of dramatic change is also a world of dramatic possibilities. China's living standards have doubled in the last decade, and will no doubt double and triple again. New opportunities are opening up for Chinese workers and Chinese entrepreneurs. New choices are opening up for Chinese consumers. And out of this economic opening springs new hope. I would argue, from the evidence of the huge success of reform so far, that the real cost would lie in keeping doors closed, in slowing the restructuring process, and in maintaining inefficient public structures.
What is true for China is true for the world. The global economy could easily double by 2020, raising global living standards by almost two-thirds - among the greatest advances in world history. Technology and communications are weaving together an interconnected planet, spreading the tools of economic and social progress, and equalizing the human condition. And we are breaking down the barriers, not just between economies, but between people, giving us a shared interest in prosperity and peace.
We must be clear about what is at stake: China's entry into the global trading system is about more than trade. It is about China's future rфle as a world economic leader. And it is about the future direction of the global economy and our global community.
I began by saying that we are at a turning point in China's relations with the world. One of those moments in history, which come but rarely, when the choices we make shape the course of events for years and even decades to come. The Cold War landscape has been swept away, as if by an historical earthquake. The next era of globalization has yet to take shape. We have a unique opportunity - between eras as well as between centuries - to lay the foundations of a new kind of international system, one which offers the best chance yet of lasting world prosperity and peace. For the first time we have in our grasp the possibility of creating a universal system based on rights and obligations agreed by consensus and binding all its members.
I repeat - the successful integration of China into the global economy is the key to many of the international challenges we face. We will need creativity in the days ahead. We will need resolve. And we will need vision. Change will come whether we like it or not. We can either engage it positively and steer it to positive ends or ignore it to our peril. The choice before us is an obvious one.
I have come to China, not as a negotiator, but as a man with one interest - to help build a truly global trading system which can bear the weight of the twenty-first century. I leave you with the message that China must be a central pillar of this system - otherwise we risk building the new century on the foundations of economic instability and an even more uncertain peace. I am confident China will bring an equally great breadth of vision to this task.

Trade flows and trade specialisation: The case of China ☆
يسلط الضوء.
We analyse trade flows between China and its main trade partners in Asia, North America and Europe.
The analysis is based on both economic indicators and the econometric estimation of a gravity model.
We apply recently developed panel data methods which explicitly take into account unobserved heterogeneity, (FEVD) technique.
Significant change in China's trading structure resulting from the fast growth of foreign trade.
A clear shift from labour-intensive to capital - and technology-intensive exports.
Using annual data for the periods 1992–2018, this paper examines trade flows between China and its main trade partners in Asia, North America and Europe, and whether increasing trade has led to industrial structural adjustment and changes in China's trade patterns. The analysis is based on both economic indicators and the estimation of a gravity model, and applies recently developed panel data methods that explicitly take into account unobserved heterogeneity, specifically the fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD) technique. The findings confirm the significant change in China's trading structure associated with the fast growth of foreign trade. In particular, there has been a shift from resource - and labour-intensive to capital - and technology-intensive exports.
تصنيف جيل.
We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their useful comments.